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A Framework for the Rejuvenation of
the American Labor Movementt
MICHAEL C. HARPER*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century dawns, the long decline of American private sector
unions continues with no readyplateau in clear view.' Should American policymakers
be concerned? Or is the decline an inevitable consequence of trends associated with
ascendant global capitalism that also will erode, albeit more slowly, union density in
other advanced industrialized nations with laws more favorable to independent labor
movements?2 In my view, the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the
second question is a qualified no. It is also my view, however, that formulating
proposals that have a realistic chance of arresting the decline requires an analysis of
precisely why we should be concerned about the current condition of private sector
unionism. Time is short. The depreciation of the political capital of American
labor-even from the level of the late seventies when labor's great push for labor-law
reform failed3 -reflects that of its membership rolls. Indeed, it is doubtful that a
President Gore, a Speaker Gephardt, and a filibuster-proof Senate would satisfy
labor's 1970s "wish-list."4 Labor's leaders and labor's friends must be ready for any
t Copyright 2001 by Michael C. Harper.
* Professor ofLaw, Boston University School of Law. I thank for comments on an earlier
draft, Sam Estreicher, Alan Hyde, and Elly Leary. I also thank Terence Noonan for research
assistance.
1. The U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the percentage
of private sector nonagricultural workers who were union members fell to single digits, 9.6%,
in 1998. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS, Jan.
2000, at 221 tbl.42. This reflects a slow but steady decline from a 16.8% level in 1983, the first
yearthe Bureau kept comparable statistics segregating private-sector workers. Bureau ofLabor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS, Jan. 1985, at 209 tbl.53. The 1983
figure itself marks a long decline from the peak for union organization of the total
nonagricultural workforce-about 35% during the 1945 to 1954 decade. See BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LABOR UNIONS INTHE UNITED STATES (1967). The picture of continuing union decline until
the middle of the last decade is fully painted in tables in MICHAEL C. HARPER & SAMUEL
ESTREICHER, LABOR LAW 107-15 (1996). Public-sector unions, of course, have fared much
better organizing workers who are not as threatened byjob loss from employer retaliation, from
the product market competition of nonunion competitors, and from strikes and permanent
replacements. Id. The unionization rate for government workers in 1998 was 37.5%. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, EMPLOYMENT& EARNINGS supra, at 221 tbl.42.
2. See, e.g., Leo Troy, Convergence in International Unionism: The Case of Canada and
the U.S.A., 30 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL 1 (1992).
3. For an account of this initiative and its failure, see BARBARA TOWNLEY-, LABOR LAW
REFORM IN U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1986); Gerald E. Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead
or Alive?, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. I (1979).
4. A filibuster in the Senate defeated the labor-law reform movement of the late 1970s,
TOWNI.EY, supra note 3, at 178-87, although Democrat Jimmy Carter was in the White House
and there were Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, id. at 12-13.
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political opportunity with a proposal for a new stable labor-relations system that will
reverse union decline without generating a political backlash that would soon negate
union gains.
In this Article I offer for consideration a somewhat different proposal than those
that dominated the debate among the academic friends of labor in the 1990s. I do so
after arguing that what seems to be the primary concern of the participants in that
debate-the muting of the "voice" of American workers as union representation
declines 6-- should not be the primary concern of policymakers when considering a
revision of American labor law. I shall argue that the problem is not that most
American workers have no representative to develop and to express their views on
the business strategies and tactics, orthe personnel policies and benefits, chosen by
their employers. The problem is that American workers have lost power-power to
extract a larger share of the returns of American enterprise and power to protect
individual employees from arbitrary, unjust, or discriminatory treatment by their
managers. The loss of this power has been somewhat mitigated by the expansion of
minimum employee benefits and individual rights through federal and state legislation
and common-law developments. But even the securing of these benefits and rights
has been compromised by the loss of independent representation in the workplace.
While my proposal is not designed to attempt to prop up a system of decentralized
collective bargaining that has always been flawed and is increasingly impotent in
today's economy, it is also not designed simply to facilitate the enterprise- or
workplace-based representation of employee views on business policies that
employees cannot, and in some cases, should not, affect against the judgment of their
managers. It is instead primarily formulated to better and more efficiently insure the
protection of individual employee rights and benefits. It is designed with the hope that
the efficiency of the protection would offer enough to American society so that
shifting political winds would make vulnerable neither a concomitant expansion of
the American union movement nor the potential for economy-wide redistributive
policies that this expansion could bring.
II. ROLES FOR AMERICAN LABOR
A. Redistribution
As most readers must be aware, the distribution of earnings in America is now
more imbalanced than that of any other rich, industrialized nation.7 For most of the
final decades of the twentieth century, moreover, as unions lost more and more labor
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. For a probing analysis, see LAWRENCE R. MISHEL ET AL, THE STATE OF WORKING
AMERICA 1998-99, at 362-68 (1999). In their Executive Summary, the authors note:
High-income families (those in the ninetieth percentile of family income) in the
United States earn almost six times more than their low-income counterparts
(those in the tenth percentile). The average ratio for other advanced economies is
under four, with only the United Kingdom (with a ratio of about five) anywhere
near the U.S. level.
Id. at 12.
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market shares, the wage imbalance in America increased8 and the relative economic
position of the American middle class deteriorated.' It is thus tempting to assume a
cause and effect relationship between the contraction of collective bargaining and the
erosion of lower- and middle-class wages,'0 incomes," and wealth. 2 The high profit
8. Id. The authors conclude that "by the mid-1990s, the United States had surpassed
Canada as the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countrywith
the greatest degree of earnings inequality among full-time workers." Id. at 366. Furthermore,
[the] typical low-wage worker in an advanced European economy earns 44%
more than in the United States. The large dispersion of earnings in the United
States relative to other countries leaves U.S. low-wage workers with very low
earnings, despite living in the country with one of the world's highest income
levels.
Id. at 368.
9. See id. at48-53. "Between 1979 and 1989, the bottom 80% [of American families] lost
income share and only the top 20% gained. Moreover, the 1989 income share of the upper fifth,
44.6%, was far greater than the share it received during the entire postwar period.. . ." Id. at
49. Extending their analysis of the data through 1996, the authors conclude that the "increase
in inequality continued unabated over the 1989-96 period .... The top fifth, and in particular
the top 5%, continued to gain at the expense of everyone else, including the group in the 80-
95th percentile range." Id. at 49-50; see also FRANK LEVY, THE NEW DOLLARS AND DREAMS:
AMERiCAN INcoMES AND EcoNOMIC CHANGE 2 (1998) (reporting that in 1969 the richest 5%
percent of families earned 15.6% of all income, while in 1996 these families earned 20.3% of
all income). The trend seems to have continued into 1999; a more recent study demonstrates
that the top quintile of families garnered more than 50% of household income in the last year
of the 1990s. David C. Johnston, Gap Between Rich and Poor Found Substantially Wider,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 5, 1999, at A16 (reporting Congressional Budget Office data analyzed by
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities). The top 1%, 2.7 million Americans, have as many
after-tax dollars to spend as the bottom 100 million. Id.
10. Despite some improvement in the last two years of what is now a decade-long
economic expansion in America, wages fell even faster for the median worker in the 1989 to
1997 period (-0.4% per year) than they did in the prior decade (-0.2% per year). MISHELET AL,
supra note 7, at 2-3, 30. Real wages "stagnated or fell between 1989 and 1997 for the bottom
60% of all workers."Id at 5. Moreover, during this period even the wages ofmale white-collar
workers, including managers, scientists, and engineers, were stagnant or declined. Id. at 119-
20. The average wages of male college graduates at the end of the period were below that of
the mid-1980s or early 1970s. Id. at 120. The wages of the average American worker reached
their 1989 level in 1999, but are still about 10% below those of 1973. See COUNCIL OF
ECONOMICADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORTOFTHEPRESIDENT (1999). American chief executive
officers, however, have been faring well. MISHEL ET AL, supra note 7, at 120. In the 1989 to
1997 period their total compensation grew by 100% and had reached 115.7 times that of the
average worker. Id.
11. Notwithstanding a loss of position relative to the richest American families, MISHEL
ETAL, supra note 7, at 48, the median American's family income did rise slightly (0.6%) from
1989 to 1997, id. at 2. This slight increase, however, derives from a much greater increase in
number of hours worked per year during this period. See id. at 71. For instance, from 1989 to
1996, the typical married couple with children worked 247 more hours per year. Id. at 2.
12. From 1983 to 1997, the share of all wealth held by the top 1% ofAmerican households
rose, and now stands at almost 40%. Id. at 261-64. The share of the wealth held by the middle
fifth of American households, on the other hand, continues to decline, see id. at 258-66;
indeed, "the value of this middle group's wealth holdings actually fell between 1989 and 1997,
2001]
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margins enjoyed by American corporations'3 as wages have stagnated may suggest
that much of the well-documented, usual union-wage premium 4 could draw from
those margins rather than from consumers through price inflation."3 Indeed, some
economic studies indicated that as much as a fifth of the rise in American inequality
before the last decade could be correlated with the decline in union density. 6 Such
a correlation would not have surprised the drafters of the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA").' 7 Both the findings in the first section of the NLRA and its legislative
history make clear that one goal of the statute was to correct the "depressi[on of]
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage. earners in industry" by righting the
"inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association.""
There is good reason to believe, however, that in today's economy only limited
income redistribution can be achieved through the kind of decentralized collective
bargaining encouraged by the NLRA. Rather than simply being a primary cause of
the widening inequalities in American incomes, the continuing decline of union
density to a great extent is an effect of the same underlying economic trends-the
globalization and deregulation of our economy. As competition has become more
global and capital more mobile, those who allocate investment funds undoubtedly
have become more sensitive to any reduction in profit margins caused by increases
in labor costs. The documented increases in both legal and illegal employer resistance
to unionization 9 seemed to have been augmented in the 1970s by particularly high
due primarily to a rise in indebtedness," id. at 9.
13. Profit levels grew from 1979 to 1997 to a before-tax level not seen since the mid- 1960s,
and an after-tax level not matched since 1959. Id. at 68-69. This growth during a period of
wage stagnation reflects a substantial redistribution of returns from labor to capital during this
period.
14. See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 43-
60 (1984) (discussing the role of unions in raising wages for workers).
15. The authors of The State of Working America conclude that if profits had grown only
at historically normal levels since 1979, "then hourly compensation could have been 7% higher
in 1997 than it actually was." MISHEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 3. It is also revealing that
between 1989 and 1996 the productive capacity of the economy increased by 8% while median
wages declined and family incomes stagnated. Id. at 2.
16. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, EMPLOYEE COUNCILS, WORKERPARTICATION, AND
OTHER SQUISHY STUFF, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 43RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 328-37 (1991); see also Thomas Lemieux, Unions and
Wage Inequality in Canada and the United States, in SMALL DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER:
LABOR MARKETS AND INCOME MAINTENANCE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 69, 70
(David E. Card & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1993) (ascribing two-fifths of the greater wage
inequality in the United States than in Canada to different rates of unionization).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
18. Id. § 151; S. REP. No. 573, at 3 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 2302 (1949); 78 CoNG. REC. 3443
(1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner). See also Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An
Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the WagnerAct, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285,291-92,
319-20 (1987).
19. Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Timesfor Unions: AnotherLookat the
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union-wage premiums' as well as by labor's loss of control ofcertain market sectors
and by the elimination of some protective governmental regulation in the
transportation and communication industries.2 Higher profit margins in the last two
decades have not reduced corporate management's resistance to union attempts to
obtain a greater share ofprofits; if similarlyhigh profits are available in other global
investments, managers must be concerned about the withdrawal of capital as profits
are eroded. Furthermore, there are limits to the redistribution of profits that unions
can achieve even through control of most of a domestic market in manufacturing and
in service industries whose work can be, and has been, outsourced outside our
borders." The rise in income inequality in part reflects the same loss of union wage-
premium jobs that has led to a decline in union-membership rolls.
In retrospect, the system of decentralized collective bargaining encouraged by the
NLRA seems to have been ill-designed to serve its redistributive goals. Shop-by-
shop, office-by-office, or even firm-by-f-rmbargaining never was able to take wages
out of competition and thereby insure any significant continuingwage premium. After
passage of the NLRA, American unions, through surprise and militant action and by
the encouragement of the Roosevelt administration during the prewar and war years,
were able to seize control of the labor markets in certain key manufacturing industries
and achieve significant wage premiums through multiemployer or pattern
bargaining. 3 But as international competition developed and regulatory protections
receded, even in some of these industries, union leverage has declined. Absent
transformed labor laws that encourage industry-wide bargaining and absent the
emergence of some form of international cooperation among unions, it is hard toimagine collective bargaining having a significant impact on income inequality in
early twenty-first century America. Furthermore, given the potential for inflationary
price increases and a wage-deflationary, labor-displacement effect in unorganized
industries, even indnstry-wide collective bargaining provides an imperfect form of
capital-to-labor income redistributionu
This is not to say that collective bargaining cannot enhance benefits for represented
Significance of Employer illegalities, 58 U. Cn. L. REV. 953, 954 (1991); Paul C. Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1983).
20. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 14, at 53-54.
21. See Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive
Character ofAmerican Labor Laws", 1990 WIsc. L. REV. 1, 108-17 (showing that earlier
union decline could be explained by sectoral shifts in employment, while union density was
stable within heavily organized sectors until the 1970s, and started to decline then in these
sectors with a changing economy and increased employer resistance).
22. See generally BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
UNIONS: NEW APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE 208-16 (1986).
23. See JaniceR. BellaceLaborLawforthePost-Industrial Workplace: BreakingtheNew
Deal Model in the USA, in LAB3OUR LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: CHANGING EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS 11, 11-13 (Janice R. Bellace & Max G. Rood eds., 1997).
24. Even Freeman and Medoffacknowledge this, stressing the compensating union benefits
of lower-wage inequality within firms, of wage standardization across firms, and of reduced
inequality between blue- and white-collar workers. FREEMAN&MEDOFF, supra note 14, at 78-
93.
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American workers without causing a comparable decline, through inflation or labor
displacement, in the income of other workers. We should not, for instance, gainsay
the studies that indicate that unions generally enhance productivity, particularly by
reducing turnover through the establishment of fair grievance processes and
structured internal labor markets." As I argue below, there is no reason to think that
all American employers cannotbe required to provide a minimally fair, dignified, and
safe workplace, without causing a substantial withdrawal of capital. Furthermore,
there undoubtedly continue to be market sectors where employers enjoy rents from
which unions can extract a further share without causing capital withdrawal.26 There
are, for instance, certain private- as well as public-sector service industries, such as
hospital care and hotel,27 that have limited geographic mobility and at least some
market power. The unorganized but burgeoning high-technology sector, though
characterized by highly mobile capital, seems dominated by firms with at least
temporary monopolistic positions. But even if the organizational hurdles in, say, the
high-tech and health-care industries were surmounted," a somewhat greater sharing
of the monopoly rents of a few firms could not affect the income of the vast majority
of middle- and lower-income Americans.
However, simply because collective bargaining in the decentralized American mode
probably cannot arrest the growing inequality in our incomes does not mean that a
strong union movement also would be hamstrung on all fronts. A strong labor
movement could achieve much more income redistribution through federal wage,
benefit, and taxation legislation than through collective bargaining.29 Employers who
might withdraw or transfer capital in the face of union demands for wage premiums
in the form of, say, health-care insurance or additional guaranteed vacation leave,
could accept the imposition of such benefits via legislation that would also affect all
domestic-competitive uses of the capital.3" Tax policy, at least when directed at
25. See id. at 162-80.
26. For a theoretical discussion ofthe situations in which unions may share in a firm's rents
or quasi rents, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis ofAmerican Labor Law,
91 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1992).
27. Notwithstanding the hotel industry's heavy use of relatively unskilled labor, the Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union ("HERE") has maintained
organization in some major urban and entertainment sites. See Dorothy Sue Cobble & Michael
Merrill, Collective Bargaining in the Hospitality Industry in the 1980s, in CONTEMPORARY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TBE PRIVATE SECTOR 447,454-55 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994).
28. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Getting Organized, Unions Struggle to Attract High-Tech
Workers, Look Toward Temporary Employees, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 8,
1999, at 3F, available at 1999 WL 20275409; Joel Kotkin, Unions See Fertile Fields at Lower
End of High Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at C4.
29. For an analysis of how unions have helped achieve the enactment of redistributive and
minimum-benefit legislation, see John Delaney& Susan Schwochau, EmployeeRepresentation
Through the Political Process, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 265, 277-87 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993).
30. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee
Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES
AND FUrURE DIRECTIONS, supra note 29, at 13, 40 (contrasting the "greater universalism of
nonwage benefits overseas, which takes these benefits 'out of competition"' (emphasis in
original)).
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individual recipients of profits, can even negate the advantages of international
investments. It is certainly revealing that the level of redistribution achieved in the
United States through tax and transfer payments or through Social Security,
unemployment insurance, or other such programs is only a fraction of that of most
other industrialized nations, many of which are competing effectively in the global
economy."
A labor movement as feeble as that in America today, however, cannot hope to
achieve income redistribution through electoral politics in the manner of many
European labormovements. Unions generally remain apart ofthe Democratic Party's
core constituency, but the leadership of the party need not and does not give priority
to labor's agenda. To be sure, Democratic presidential candidates during contested
primary campaigns and those politicians who run for election in districts where
unions retain special pockets of strength attempt to secure the support of unions who
can provide both limited financial support and valuable campaign workers.32 To an
increasing extent, however, even such politicians promise union leaders only the
protection of current law and limited special-interest legislation, shying from major
redistributional initiatives that could jeopardize business contributions necessary to
the financing of any significant campaign today. Labor's early endorsement of
candidates in Democratic primaries33 reflects the strategy of a special-interest lobby
able to make deals for limited goals rather than that of a political movement to which
any elected official must respond. The results are not surprising: tax cuts are framed
to further favor the most fortunate Americans; income redistribution initiatives
generally do not find a place on the national agenda; and even major efforts to insure
socialbenefits, such as President Clinton's first-term health-care plan,34 seem doomed
to failure. If the system of American pluralism and countervailing politicalpower was
ever vital and healthy,3" it is now, at least on redistributive economic issues, all but
mon'bund.
No other political representative of the economic (rather than social, cultural, or
religious) interests of average Americans as workers has or is likely to emerge.36 The
collective-action problem in politics ii especially serious. Moreover, the problem has
been exacerbated by the elimination of the spoils system and most organized political
"machines," and by the increasing importance of the electronic media and the money
necessary to support its use. Without an organization that can bundle and direct his
31. SeeA New Swedish Prosperity, Even Within a Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999,
at Al, C4. For a comprehensive analysis, see Joel Rogers, UnitedStates: Lessonsfrom Abroad
and Home, in WORKS COUNCILS 375, 394-97 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995)
(reporting that the United States ranks second to last among OECD states in the social funding
of benefits and does comparatively little redistribution through tax and transfer payments).
32. E.g., Jeanne Cummings, Bradley and Gore Duel for Labor's Backing in Iowa, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11, 1999, at A24; Josh Goldstein, Philadelphia Labor Unions Urge Members To
Vote Democratic, PH1IADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 11, 1999, available at 1999 WL 28697872.
33. E.g., Glenn Burkins, AFL-CIO Leaders Who Support Gore Say They Have Votes for
Early Backing, WA.L ST. J., Oct. 11, 1999, at A24.
34. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993).
35. See DEREK C. BOK& JOHNT. DUNI.OP, LABOR AND THE ArMRICAN COMMuNrrY 384-
426 (1970).
36. See.Delaney & Schwochau, supra note 29, at 265.
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or her marginal electoral leverage, the average individual voter can only feel impotent
and alienated. The decline in American electoral participation, 7 especially among
lower-income voters,3" is thus totally predictable.
Unfortunately, the prospect of exerting political power through unions is likely to
attract few new members. In part this is because the American labor movement is
caught in a vicious downward cycle: as its membership rolls contract, its political
power-declines, and it has less leverage to achieve the political successes that would
attract new members. The attractiveness to potential new members of unions as a
representative in electoral politics also must be limited, however. The connection
between political success and union membership probably seems too attenuated to
warrant the costs of union membership, especially when a free ride on the payment
of others seems plausible and when the costs include, in addition to union dues, th&
risks ofjob loss from employer retaliation, strikes, or capital withdrawal.39 Organizers
cannot successfully sell unions by primarily emphasizing their external political or
electoral role.
B. Voice
Although organizers also typically do not sell their unions by claiming that a union
can somehow bring "democracy" to the workplace or enable workers to influence
management decisions on business or personnel strategy, for many academic friends
of labor the loss of an amplifying representative of employee views to management
seems to be the primary reason to lament union decline. For some the concern seems
to be, in part, the loss of a valuable employee perspective on how American
businesses can become more productive and create enlarged surpluses to be shared
by labor and capital.4" The argument seems to be that effective and efficient labor-
management cooperation requires that workers have some type of representative to
speak for them in order that they not feel intimidated and that their voice not be
ignored. For other academics the claim maybe, in part, that senior managers cannot
determine which particular collective goods-that is, which pension plan, health
insurance plan, or grievance system-can most efficiently satisfy their workers
without having these workers speak through some collective representative.4 Not
37. Participation in presidential elections, for instance, has declined from 62.8% in 1960
to 49% in 1996. Robin Toner, If a Poll Falls in the Forest and No One Hears It..., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at D16.
38. David Callahan, Ballot Blocks: What Gets thePoor to the Polls?, AM. PROSPECT, July-
Aug. 1998, at 68.
39. See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair Starting Over: Imagining a Labor-Law for
Unorganized Workers, in THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 57, 60-65
(Matthew W. Finkin ed., 1993).
40. See, e.g., BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE: A
LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BusINEss (1992); Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor
Relations, in THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 39, at 95, 115-
18.
41. Gottesman, supra note 39, at 77-78; see, e.g., PAUL WEII.ER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE 181-83 (1990); see also Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of
Competitive Markets, in THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 39,
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surprisingly, for those who believe that the primary problem with union decline is the
muting of the "voice" of unrepresented workers on matters of business or personnel
strategy, part of the legislative agenda should be at least a partial repeal of section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA42 so that employers can be more free to fashion their own
systems of employee representation to achieve more efficient cooperation and a
clearer understanding of employee-benefit prefeiences.43
I am skeptical, not only of the wisdom of repealing section 8(a)(2), but also of the
claims that employees have insufficient channels for communicating their views on
either business strategy or desired benefits in the nonunion workplace. I find
particularly problematic any claim that American businesses would be more
successful and create greater surpluses iftheirmanagements were somehow impelled,
beyond what they deem desirable, to be influenced by the views of subordinate
employees or their representatives, regarding business strategy, tactics, or even
production processes. This claim reaches beyond the premises of collective
bargaining under the NLRA, which, of course, does not require employers to
compromise with union bargaining agents on "permissive" topics of business
strategy, tactics, orproduction." Employers must onlybargain andmore importantly
can only be subject to strikes or other economic coercion, S on issues involving how
the firm's surplus is to be dividedbetween capital and labor, not on issues concerning
how that surplus can be best created.46
The academics' plea for some form of representation to provide greater employee
influence on the'latter issues in response to union decline, to be sure, is consistent
with their discomfort with the current distinction between mandatory and permissive
bargaining topics.47 But the arguments for this rejection, like the claim that American
business would be better off if its managers were somehow forced to consider more
fully the views of subordinate employees on firm strategy and tactics, have never
been persuasive. The mandatory/permissive distinction does not in any way limit
cooperative collective bargaining. If they deem it in their firm's interest, managers are
at 13, 31-32.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
43. WEILER, supra note 41, at 211-15; see Estreicher, supra-note 41, at 45; Gottesman,
supra note 39, at 84-85; cf Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be
Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 430-31 (1992) (suggesting
qualification of section 8(a)(2) to encourage labor-management cooperation); Freeman &
Rogers, supra note 30, at 64; Rogers, supra note 40, at 112 n.26 (advocating qualification of
section 8(a)(2) where employees seem to endorse employer influence).
44. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981); Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
45. Cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (leading
case-holding that an employer may not insist that a union bargain about certain "permissive"
topics within its authority).
46. For my own attempt to rationalize judicial and labor-board doctrine on this topic, see
Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The
Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982).
47. See, e.g., BIJESTONE & BLLESTONE, supra note 40, at 251-53; Craver, supra note 43,
at 427; Estreicher, supra note 41, at 49-50; Rogers, supra note 21, at 135. But cf. WEILER,
supra note 41, at 25 8 n.40 (suggesting that expansion of the content of the duty to bargain may
intrude too much on employer discretion).
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free to make legally enforceable commitments on any permissive issue after sharing
relevant information and listening to the arguments of union negotiators; managers
simply are not required to pause to listen or to be subject to coercion on permissive
topics if they deem it in the firm's interests to move on.4" Similarly, when managers
of nonunion firms decide they can benefit from the views of particular subordinate
employees on production processes or even on marketing strategies or tactics, they
are free to solicit and respond to these views in ways that assure that there will not
be any retaliation. Despite the distorting hysteria concerning section 8(a)(2),49 senior
managers are also totally free to delegate decisions on the details of production
processes to groups or "teams" of generally subordinate employees or to discuss with
these teams how production, marketing, or other business tactics can be improved.'
To be coherent, therefore, the claim that employees lack adequate influence over
how their employer's business is operated must be that since American managers
often do not understand how much they could benefit from hearing employee views,
they must be forced to listen through some coercive process. It is this claim that I find
unconvincing: I see no conflict of interest on the issue of employee influence on
business strategy between firm managers and their principals (shareholders); and it
seems absurd to argue that labor leaders or other employee representatives, however
well-schooled with hardknocks orcommon-sense lessons, canmakebetterjudgments
on what business strategies or tactics will maximize a firm's generated surpluses than
can sophisticated American managers with the best business educations available in
the world. I continue to believe that in our capitalist economy collective bargaining
should be about the division of firm surpluses, and that managers, in response to
consumer demand, should determine how those surpluses are created.
I also do not find ultimately persuasive the claim that employees require some
collective representative in.order for management to understand what particular
collective goods will best satisfy employee needs atthe lowest cost to the firm. This
moderate claim for collective employee "voice" is not based on the assumption that
senior managers must be forced to listen to their subordinates in order to maximize
the firm's surplus. Rather, this claim is based on the assumption that senior managers
need the collective amplification of employee views in order to understand how to use
the portion of the surplus available to labor in ways that will best satisfy their
employees' preferences."
Although somewhat more plausible than the first assumption, the second
48. See Michael C. Harper, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain Concerning Business
Transformations, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE 25, 28-33 (Samuel Estreicher &
Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988).
49. The "findings" contained in the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act ('CTEAM
Act"), advanced in Congress to mitigate the impact of section 8(a)(2), assert that "the escalating
demands of global competition have compelled an increasing number of employers... to make
dramatic changes in workplace and employer-employee relationships" for "enhancing...
productivity and competitiveness," which are "threatened by legal interpretations of the
prohibition against employer-dominated 'companyunions."' S. 295,105th Cong. § 2(a)(1), (4),
(7) (1997); H.R. 634, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(1), (4), (7) (1997).
50. See Michael C. Harper, The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the
Contemporary Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2322, 2326-37 (1998).
51. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 41, at 31-32; Gottesman, supra note 39, at 77-78.
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assumption also is difficult to square with the reality of the sophistication of modem
American management. Today's personnel managers, well-schooled in how to attract
and develop "human resources,"' must generally have a very good idea of how to get
the most out of every dollar they spend on labor-whether they can attract and retain
the workers they want by, for instance, enhancing their pension plan rather than
adding dental benefits to their health plan, providing more vacation leave, or adding
an additional percentage to next year's pay increases. The fact that all these benefits
constitute collective goods that can be efficiently provided only to all employees
rather than to just a few does not prevent managers from being proactive in
discovering employee preferences, rather than simplyreactive to collective employee
pressure.
To the extent the personnel officers need more information on employee
preferences, they can obtain this information, with no concern of running afoul of
section 8(a)(2), through questionnaires and surveys of all or a targeted group of
e'mployees.53 The solicitation of views of individual employees need not be at all
intimidating if management does not want it to be-management can elicit honest
views if honest views are what it truly wants. No survey can elicit preferences that
can guide the detailed structuring of some benefit plan, of course. Such structuring
requires expertise and concentrated attention. But it is naive to suggest that the
expertise and attention applied by union or other employee representatives on such
details is guided by, rather than directive of, employee preferences.
Section 8(a)(2) does constrain management's use of nonindependent employee
representatives to filter or aggregate the preferences of employees. Indeed, the most
insistent proponents of a repeal of section 8(a)(2) are not intellectual academics
concerned about the abstraction of employee "voice," but rather business
representatives who claim to want their clients to be free to form and orchestrate
employee-representation committees.' The business representatives claim that
American business can benefit by the formation of joint labor-management
committees that discuss and formulate suggestions not only on topics like production
processes, which do not define a "labor organization" protected from employer
interference by section 8(a)(2), but also on topics like benefit plans and working
conditions that make section 8(a)(2) relevant.55
However, as I have argued elsewhere, the business representatives' story about the
impact of section 8(a)(2) is not credible.' Managers, both historically and
contemporaneously, have neither formed nor orchestrated employee representation
52. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN Er AL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONs 43, 62-64 (1986).
53. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993), discussed in
Harper, supra note 50, at 2332.
54. The Labor Policy Association, for instance, which has led the lobbying effort to dilute
section 8(a)(2), represents "senior human resource executives of more than 200 major U.S.
companies." Daniel V. Yager, Statement Before the Commission for the Future of Worker-
Management Relations 1 (Jan. 19, 1994) (transcript on file with the Indiana Law Journat).
55. See, e.g., id. at 14-21; Richard A. Beaumont, Statement Before the Commission for the
Future of Worker-Management Relations (Jan. 19, 1994) (transcript on file with the Indiana
Law Journal).
56. See Harper, supra note 50, at 2326-38.
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committees (under various and sundry sobriquets) to gain a better understanding of
employee preferences, which usually can be measured directly. Rather, managers
have formed these committees to influence worker preferences, to align them with
management priorities, to create a distorted impression of employee influence, and
to extract information about efficient production that it may not be in the self-interest
of employees to provide-at least in the absence of the protection of independent
representatives.' The last motivation is often salient today as managers attempt to
understand how they can eliminate all employee "slack" through the intensification
of work and the perfection, rather than rejection, of Tayloristic techniques of "lean
production." '5 As noted above, section 8(a)(2) does not restrain managers from
directly soliciting information from employees on ways the firm can enhance surplus
creation.59 It should, however, proscribe the manipulative extraction of information
by fellow employees posing as representatives on matters of surplus division.'
Nonetheless, there is some persuasive force in an aspect of the claim of the
academics who lament the loss of employee "voice" associated with the decline of
unions. In the absence of a collective representative, employers may have difficulty
extracting constructive complaints from individual employees about managerial
decisions already made. Employees may understand that such complaints, unlike
views on which collective goods are most valuable or on how production can be made
more efficient, threaten managers and may provoke retaliation. It may be that
managers cannot be expected to assuage employee qualms about the airing of many
complaints or grievances that are in the interest of the firm to address because, in
many cases, managers' interests as agents are distinct from those of their principals,
the owners of the firm. This suggests that firm may sometimes gain from the
encouragement of the expression of employee grievances offered by collective
representation.
In my view, this does not argue for a qualification of the basic command of section
8(a)(2)---collective representatives mustbe independentofemployercontrol. Without
such independence, a representative cannot alleviate the average employee's concern
about managerial retaliation. Furthermore, without the independent representative
having the authority and capacity to challenge management, it is unlikely that average
employees will benefit from collective amplification of their complaints.
The concern about the muting of employee complaints and grievances, however,
57. See id. at 2343-56; see also Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law
of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 CoLUM. L. REV.
753, 825-78 (1994).
58. See Harper, supra note 50,. at 2357-69. The intensification of work may enhance
productivity and lead to an increase in wages as well as profits. Id. It still may not be in the
interests of workers, or of a general goal of social equality, however, because it also impairs
working conditions and magnifies risks of injury. Id.; see also Mark D. Brenner et al.,
"Flexible" Work Practices and Occupational Safety and Health: Exploring the Relationship
Between Cumulative Trauma Disorders and Workplace Transformation 2-3 (July 1999)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (finding a statistically
significant relationship between cumulative trauma disorders, the use ofemployee-involvement
committees, and just-in-time production).
59. See supra text accompanying note 50.
60. See Harper, supra note 50, at 2370-75.
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does suggest a strong reason to rue the decline of unions. As some advocates of
collective employee "voice" have stressed, in the absence of unions, managers listen
most closely to the views not of the average worker, but rather to the views of the
marginal worker who the managers are most interested in retaining and who can most
easily find other work.6 Union leaders, by contrast, like other politicians in a system
dominated by votes rather than money (unlike our electoral system), must be attuned
to the views of the average constituent. This contrast affects the benefits offered by
managers. In a union environment, for instance, the interests of more senior, and thus
less mobile, workers are more likely to be served by seniority preferences and pension
benefits. 2 Unions are also likely to promote pay equity among workers.63
The different responses of management to average workers in union and nonunion
environments, however, do not reflect an inability to hear the voices of these workers
without the amplification of union representation, but rather a lack of interest in
listening. The problem, if it is a problem at all, is a problem of collective employee
power not of collective employee representation. If the problem is to be addressed,
it must be by the assignment of real legal authority to the collective employee
representative, not by the mere amplification of a voice that can be ignored by
management.
C. Assuring Minimum Rights and Fair Treatment for Average Workers
Should we view any lack of attention given by nonunion employers to the interests
and complaints of average or relatively disfavored employees as a serious problem
that is further aggravated with each decline in union density? This question, I think,
is related to a second question: Should the decline of the countervailing power of
independent unions at the workplace be a concern because this power is not available
to protect average or disfavored workers from being treated arbitrarily or below
socially-established minimum standards? In my view, the decline of union power to
protect workers from arbitrary or other socially unacceptable treatment and the
diminishment of union political strength are the two major reasons to lament the
current state of unions in America. Moreover, the workplace function of protecting
workers from arbitrary or unfair treatment, unlike the political function of
representing the economic interests of average workers in the political system,
provides a basis on which to rebuild the union movement.
There is good reason to believe that the decline of unions denies an increasing
number of American workers a fair, nondiscriminatory, dignified, and safe
workplace. In the first place, there is a fundamental conflict of interest between firm
management and most average employees that does not fully reflect that between
capital and labor. Managers, like all human beings, value discretion, control, and
power-the exercise of which may affect disfavored workers. The presence of an
independent union almost invariably limits managerial discretion and control over
personnel issues. Unions that successfullynegotiate collective bargaining agreements
61. See, e.g., FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 14, at 107-08; WERLER, supra note 41, at
181-82.
62. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 14, at 122-35.
63. See id. at 78-93.
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almost always insist on the establishment of a grievance system culminating in
arbitration before some type of neutral tribunal.' Outside industries like construction
or temporary services, where employees regularly change employers, unions also
typically negotiate seniority systems that help structure stable and equitable internal-
labor markets.65 A similar function is performed even for temporary employees by
agreements to use union hiring halls. Where necessary, unions also have negotiated
limitedjob descriptions to protect workers frombeing disfavored byinequitable work
assignments.'
The studies that have found unions to have a positive impact on employee
productivity suggest that this impact derives from a reduction of employee turnover
that in turn results from an effective and credible grievance-arbitration system and
from a fair seniority system.67 Some managerial agents, understanding that their
standing with their principals (their firm's shareholders) might be improved by an
increase in employee productivity, have therefore been willing to sacrifice some of
their control by the unilateral implementation of elements of such systems even
without the prodding of an independent union.6" But few managers have been willing
to accept the definitive check of grievance adjudication before a truly neutral
arbitrator in the absence of an independent union.
It is understandable why shareholder representatives have not insisted on the
implementation of grievance-arbitration systems to attempt to capture any
productivity enhancement that they might generate. On the one hand, embracing an
independent collective employee representative as part of such a system invites
collective bargaining for wage premiums and pressure to share firm surpluses with
represented employees.
On the other hand, operating a grievance-arbitration system without independent
union representation of employee grievants may not offer the same benefits to
employees or to their firms as does a union-based system. If employees do not view
a nonunion system as fair and effective, it will not reduce turnover or enhance
productivity. Employees may use grievances in nonunion systems as "exit"
complaints, rather than as tools to correct problems in jobs to which they are
committed.69 Using a system only when not planning to return to work is rational if
one fears retaliation.
Moreover, there are other good reasons for employees, as well as independent
observers, to doubt that a nonunion grievance-arbitration system, even if it culminates
in arbitration before a neutral, can offer the same protections offered by a union-
based system. Unions offer experienced and trained representatives who have
64. See BAsIc PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (Bureau of National Affairs, 14th ed.,
1995) (99%).
65. Id. at 85 (ca. 90%).
66. Id. at 124 (ca. 60%).
67. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 14, at 162-80.
68. See RONALDBERENBEIM, NON-UNIONCOMPLAINTSYSTEMS: ACORPORATEAPPRAISAL
3-6 (1980); ALAN F. WESTIN & ALFRED G. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
WrrHOUT LITIGATION 13, 22 (1988).
69. There is evidence that employees do, in fact, use nonunion systems in such a manner.
David Lewin, Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An Empirical Analysis of
Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823, 836-37 (1990).
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continuing knowledge ofthe particular workplace and its managers. Unions also offer
protection of witnesses from retaliation and the development of supporting evidence
during the early stages of grievance processing when the evidence is fresh and most
easily secured." Furthermore, union-based systems, through seniority clauses and
other contractual standards, typically provide protections against managers either
disguising discharges through layoffs, developing cases against disfavored employees
by unfair assignments or other formal discipline and warnings short of discharge.7'
The number of workers who suffer unremedied arbitrary or inequitable treatment
because of the absence of an independent union defender probably has been reduced
only marginally by developments in American employment-law over the last few
decades. Employer retaliation against workers who have claimed statutory
entitlements or who publicly have blown whistles against illegal behavior has been
curtailed by legislative72 or judicial recognition of new causes of action.73
Additionally, in some jurisdictions more highly skilled and compensated employees
have been able to take advantage of their employer's implied contractual
commitments to claim damages for wrongful discharge.7 However, very few ofthese
cases have been brought by workers displaced from jobs traditionally represented by
unions. Such jobs typically are favored neither with salaries sufficient to attract
plaintiffs' attorneys nor the implied employer commitments on which to base
wrongful discharge actions in the most "progressive" of jurisdictions. Furthermore,
even proposed (as well as Montana's enacted)75 state legislation designed to protect
all employees from discharge for lack of good cause76 suffer not only from many of
the deficiencies of employer-designed grievance systems, but also would do nothing
to protect employees from other forms of arbitrary or inequitable treatment while
employed.
Federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of various status
categories-including race, sex, national origin7 and age--promise protection
against a broader range of unfair treatment, including workplace harassment.79 Such
laws do not, however, reach the arbitrary treatment of employees caused by the
70. See, e.g., James Wallihan, Too Little, Too Late: The Limits ofStand-Alone Arbitration
in Discharge Cases, LAB. STUD. J., Spring 1996, at 49-52; see also, e.g., Julius G. Getman,
Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 923-24 (1979).
71. See, e.g., Wallihan, supra note 68, at 53-54.
72. E.g., EnergyReorganization Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(3) (1994); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-.368 (West 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to :19-8 (West 2000);
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988).
73. E.g., Bellinev. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1991); Palmateerv. International
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (11. 1981).
74. E.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
75. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1989).
76. E.g., MODELEMPLOYmENT TERMINATiON ACT, 7A U.L.A. 428 (1991).
77. E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
78. E.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
79. E.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (endorsing a cause of action
under Title VII against discriminatory working conditions).
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personal animus, indifference, or negligence of supervisors or other managers. 0
Moreover, in the absence of direct overt comments or policies, employment-
discrimination plaintiffs have found it difficult to prove that managerial
decisionmaking was influenced, possibly subconsciously, by consideration of some
protected categories.8' Perhaps concerned with the encouragement ofburdensome and
specious litigation, the courts have resisted the development of doctrine that would
make such proof more feasible.8" Even the availability of attorneys fees in civil rights
cases 3 has not resulted in the litigation of nearly as many individual discrimination
cases as would be considered in arbitration if all employees protected by laws like
Title VII were instead protected by private systems of industial justice founded in
collective bargaining agreements." As a number of commentators have noted, most
claimants under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 5
which would seem to be the type of antidiscrimination law best suited to challenging
managerial indifference to the plight of the average, less-mobile, senior worker
typically protected by collective bargaining agreements, 6 have been white-collared,
highly salaried employees.8 7
Indeed, rather than supplanting unions in their role as protector of employees from
arbitrary treatment, antidiscrimination laws, like other minimum-benefit laws, provide
further reason to lament the weakening of union power to champion the interests of
disfavored employees. Unions can help implement antidiscrimination laws more
effectively' and efficiently, just as their workplace presence can assist in the
implementation of other minimum-benefit laws. A union's continuing presence in the
workplace as a monitor or watch dog, for instance, can insure that a reinstatement
remedy is more lasting and meaningful.8 Even more importantly, by securing the
establishment of fair arbitration systems, unions should be able to provide a cheaper
80. E.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 507 U.S. 502 (1993) (confirming that
discrimination on the basis of personal animus is not prohibited by Title VII).
81. See generally Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MiCH.
L. REv. 2229 (1995).
82. E.g., Hicks, 509 U.S. at 523-24 (holding that Title VII does not require fact-finders to
assume a discriminatory motive when employers cannot articulate a legitimate, credible motive
for a challenged employment action).
83. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(h) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).
84. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The ChangingRole ofLaborArbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83,
91-92 (2001).
85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
86. See Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz
Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 787-93 (1997).
87. E.g., DANIEL P. O'MEARA, PROTECTINGTHE GROwINGNUMBEROFOLDER WORKERS:
TBE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 48 (1989). One study of ADEA litigation
concluded that almost four out of five ADEA claimants are white-collar employees. CATHIA.
SHATrUCK, ADEA LITIGATION SURvEY (1983), reprinted in Recipients ofADEA Settlements
Are Mostly Long-Term Male Employees, 7 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Jan. 12, 1984).
88. See WELEXR, supra note 41, at 85-87 (contrasting studies demonstrating a 70-80% rate
of return to work for an appreciable period in unionized workplaces, with studies showing only
a 10-30% success rate for reinstatement remedies in nonunion workplaces).
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and quicker adjudication system than that provided by courts.89 Such a system,
supported in part by risk spreading through union dues, is much more likely to be
available in practice to lower salaried, average workers. A strong case also can be
made that private arbitrators, chosenjointly by managers and independent unions for
their neutrality and understanding ofparticular working environments, are more likely
to accurately decide discrimination cases, just as they are more likely to understand
the meaning of collective agreements."
Rather than obviating the critical role of an independent collective representative
as a champion of industrial justice for the average employee, antidiscrimination
protective legislation thus renders that role potentially even more important. The same
is true for other minimum benefit legislation. The Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 ("OSHA")' 9 is a much cited example.' Unions at the plant, office, or
store can provide continuing monitoring, while overworked federal agents only can
hope to conduct sporadic reviews." As a collective guardian of the job security of
represented employees, unions also can encourage employees to invoke their OSHA-
provided rights to initiate agency inspections and enforcement and to accompany and
inform government inspectors.' Similarly, unions can make the disclosure required
by statutes like the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")93 and Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act of 1988
("WARNA")94 much more meaningful to workers trying to understand their options
in an increasingly complicated economys
Furthermore, for the same reasons that employers cannot effectively provide a
89. E.g., Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1187 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over
Litigation: Reflections of a Judge, Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitration 16 (1983).
88. Cf. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
585 (1960) (holding that collective bargaining agreement's arbitration- clause required
arbitration of disputes "as to the meaning and application of the provisions of [the]
agreement").
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
90. E.g., WELER, supra note 41, at 157-58; Rogers, supra note 31, at 387-88.
91. W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 1973-
1983, 17 RAND J. EcON. 567, 571-75 (1986).
92. See, in particular, the statistical work by David Weil demonstrating in union
workplaces significantly higher levels of employee participation in OSHA inspections, of
enforcement intensity, ofcitation rates, and ofpenalties. David Weil, BuildingSafety: TheRole
of Construction Unions in the Enforcement of OSHA, 13 J. LAB. RES. 121-32 (1992); David
Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 IND. REL. 20-36 (1991).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
95. David Weil's empirical work indicates that the presence of unions increases regulatory
activitynot only under OSHA, but also under awide variety ofother statutes, including ERISA
and WARNA, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. David Weil, Regulating the Workplace: The
Vexing Problem of Implementation, in 7 ADVANCES IN INDUsTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS
247,252-55 (David Lewin et al. eds., 1996). Unions also encourage employees to invoke their
rights to unemployment insurance and workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 263-65.
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system of industrial justice without an independent employee representative as a
source of countervailing power, our minimum-benefit laws cannot be effectively
enforced by delegation of responsibility to employee-representation committees
established, supported, and influenced by employers. Without independence,
employee representatives are subject to manipulation by managers and by
management-favored workers who are least in need of protection. Without
independence, employee representatives are not credible or legitimate delegates of
minimum individual-employee rights such as those granted by antidiscrimination
legislation. In sum, if employee representatives are not independent of employer
authority, the protection of the rights of the average American worker maybe best left
to outside government agents. 96
There is, therefore, great reason to be concerned about the decline in independent
employee representation caused by shrinking union density. That decline has resulted
in a weakened capacity to resist, in thepolitical arena, economic trends toward greater
income inequality. It has also prevented many American workers frombeing assured
the minimally fair, dignified, and safe workplace that can be secured through
collective agreements and that to some extent is promised in federal and state
minimum-benefit laws. The latter effect, unlike the former, however, may suggest
how legislation might be framed to reverse union decline. It is time to turn to that
framing.
III. THE PROPOSAL
A. Criteria for Evaluation
The above analysis indicates that labor-law reform proposals should be evaluated
by several criteria. Some of these criteria are suggested by the primary reasons we
should be concerned by union decline. First, labor-law reform must facilitate the
development of independent countervailing employee power to insure both the
protection of externally imposed employee rights and minimum benefits and also the
establishment of grievance-arbitration systems to more generally protect workers
from arbitrary or inequitable treatment. Second, labor-law reform should encourage
a shift toward more industry-wide or sectoral-redistributive bargaining and away from
ultimately frustrating and ineffectual situs- or enterprise-based bargaining. Third,
labor-law reform should promise some immediate enhancement of the presence on
the political stage of representatives of the economic interests of middle- and lower-
income Americans.
Some criteria are also suggested by more practical considerations, however. Thus,
labor-law reform must take account of American traditions and current institutions.
It must develop and build on these traditions and institutions, rather than attempt to
96. In his latest study of the impact of unions on the enforcement of OSHA, David Weil
discovered that the large gap between enforcement in union and nonunion workplaces actually
was widened in Oregon after that state mandated safety and health committees in the private
sector after 1990. David Weil, Are Mandated Health and Safety Committees Substitutesfor or
Supplements to Labor Unions?, 52 INDus. & LAB. REL REv. 339, 358 (1999). As Weil
concluded, this indicates that such committees can supplement, but not supplant, the activities
of independent unions. Id.
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overlay them with structures lifted from different cultures without the integration of
other supp ortive traditions and institutions from those cultures.97 Furthermore, labor-
law reform also must be attentive to the needs and concerns of American business.9
It must offer some potential cost savings and must not cause the substantial loss of
jobs, even as it provides more certain guarantees of minimum benefits, justice, and
dignity at the workplace, and provides a basis for redistributional initiatives. This is
true not onlybecause of the decline in labor's political power, but also because of the
economic realities that have in part caused that decline.
Applying these criteria to the most prominent proposals thus far advanced by
academic friends of labor exposes the flaws of each. Consider, for instance, proposals
to encourage employee representation by unions that do not command the support of
a majority of workers even in some small units that would be considered appropriate
forbargaining under current labor-board standards.9 Current law, of course, prohibits
employer discrimination against concerted action by any collection of employees,"
but some academic proposals also would require employers to bargain in good faith
with any employee representative, regardless of the extent of that representative's
support.
10 1
Such a requirement probably would encourage union membership and thus
potentially could enhance the political strength of organized labor. But it also could
encourage the further fractioning of that strength, especially in our era of divisive
cultural politics."° It certainly is hard to contemplate how compelled bargaining with
minority unions could lead to more effective centralized bargaining, rather than
further ineffectual and even competitive posturing by union leadership. Furthermore,
despite the creative attempts by some of its advocates to suggest how compelled
minority bargaining could be made practical," 3 the business community must
understand the potential costs of competing unions and proliferating negotiations. For
instance, unions, as exclusive majority representatives, help develop employee
consensus and control dissidents.' Shifting these functions to firm managers would
make collective bargaining more expensive for American business. Therefore, rather
than offering American workers any hope for economy- or industry-wide
97. Estreicher, supra note 41, at 32, 39.
98. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Reflections on Labor Law Reform and the Crisis ofAmerican
Labor, in THm LEGAL FUTURE OFEMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 39, at 215,222-23.
99. E.g., Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority
Employee Representation, in THE LEGALFUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note
39, at 191, 198; Clyde W. Summers, Unions Without Majority-a BlackHole?, 66 Cm.-KENT
L. REV. 531 (1990).
100. E.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9.(1962) (protecting activityregardless
of whether it is intended to lead to collective bargaining).
101. E.g., Finkin, supra note 99, at 198; Summers, supra note 99, at 538-39.
102. Some commentators indeed advocate cultural identity-based unionism as an
accommodation of such politics. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in
the Emerging System of Employment Law, in THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION, supra note 39, at 156-59.
103. See Finkin, supra note 99, at 199-203.
104. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601
(1956).
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redistributive bargaining, compelling minority bargaining would only impose new
costs on American business and encourage additional movements of capital away
from disruptive local unions or "caucuses."
The suggestion that American labor law should import the institution of works
councils from continental European industrialized democracies" 5 also suffers under
the light of the criteria generated by my analysis. To the extent that a works-council
law required such bodies to be independent of employer influence, these bodies could
help assure the guarantee of the minimum rights and benefits promised by other
American laws. A works-council law also could attempt to empower councils to
implement grievance-arbitration systems, although councils would have to be given
authority either to strike or to enlist government assistance to avert employer
recalcitrance against such systems.
Adopting a works-council system as a means of assuring minimally fair and
equitable treatment for American workers would probablylead to a further weakening
of unions and collective bargaining within the American system, however.0 6 Union
organizers would lose one of their primary, if not their most important, selling points.
Union organization would further shrink, and with it any hopes of centralized,
meaningful collective bargaining, or of a more authoritative voice in electoral politics
for the economic interests of middle- and lower-income Americans. Works councils
will not be adopted in America in the near future because union leaders, like business
leaders, understand that work councils are not in their interests.'0 7 In European
nations where works councils have provided an effective parallel track for employee
representation, unions have been strong politically and have conducted industry-wide
collective bargaining. 'O Unions thus have been able to use, rather than be displaced
105. See, e.g., WEELER, supra note 41; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 30, at 61-65.
106. Even Joel Rogers, a primary advocate of the introduction of works councils into the
U.S. system, acknowledges that rather than a "strengthening of the labor movement," it is "at
least equally plausible" that any such introduction
would lead to substitution away from unions-as is suggested by the Dutch case,
and that of France-and a further devolution of the importance of extrafirm
structures of mediation and support of the very sort desired .... [I]fcouncils need
external unions to function well, and the introduction of councils would weaken
unions as presently organized in the United States, how would the introduction
of councils into this already decentralized system do anybody any good?
Rogers, supra note 31, at 399-400.
107. See Jacoby, supra note 98, at 222.
108. As Wolfgang Streeck explains, outside of West Germany and before the 1970s, works
councils served only consultative and consensus building roles. Wolfgang Streeck, Works
Councils in Western Europe: From Consultation to Participation, in WORKS COUNCILS, supra
note 31, at 313, 316-17. Non-German unions thus came to view councils as threats to "worker
solidarity across enterprise lines, potentially replacing it with solidarity between individual
employers and their workforces across class lines." Id. at 317. This was not the case in
Germany not only because of its strong ideology of industrial democracy and cooperation, but
also because German unions were sufficiently united and influential to "take over the councils
and exercise council rights as union rights."Id. at 321 (emphasis in original). Since the 1970s
in nations like Sweden and Italy, where the union movement has remained strong through
centralized bargaining, unions have been willing to cooperate with employers in the fashioning
of workplace-based representational structures that operate to solve workplace issues and to
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by, the councils.
Finally, consider the range of proposals advanced by academic friends of labor to
facilitate union organization and the acceptance of an initial collective bargaining
agreement. These proposals include more timely andpunitive remedies for anti-union
discharges in organizational campaigns, insuring effective union organizer access to
employees both at the work-site and at the employees' homes, and compulsory
recognition based on signed cards registering majority employee support or at least
based on "instant" accelerated elections that do not provide employers time to stage
effective illegal or legal resistance.' Understanding that current law does not provide
many newly certified unions with meaningful bargaining leverage, and noting that
first contracts are only secured in about one in two new units, some also have
advocated first-contract interest arbitration to insure that collective bargaining has a
chance to survive where employees want to try it."°
I have little doubt that enactment of a range of aggressive proposals along these
lines, including sufficiently punitive remedies, card-check recognition, and first-
contract arbitration, could reverse the continuing decline of union density. If
combined with other labor-law reform proposals that are or should be on the union
"wish list," including the contraction ofthe supervisory and managerial exemption,"I
the abrogation of employer authority to hire permanent replacements for economic
strikers,'"2 protection of some secondary union-protest activity,"3 and various ideas
on how to deal with the increasing prevalence of temporary workers and capital-
ownership transfers,"" the enactment and retention of these proposals might well
provide the union movement with the opportunity to expand to levels not seen in two,
if not four, decades.
Yet, as long as American capital enjoys the benefits of global mobility and
confronts the rigors of competitive product markets, it is hard to imagine our political
institutions long accepting a labor-relations system so designed to encourage
redistribution through decentralized collective bargaining. Enactment of the labor
movement's "wish lisf of proposals under the most favorable political conditions
would not create a stable system that could survive the resistance of American
business when political conditions changed. The critics of a reinvigorated
cooperate to improve firm efficiency in the same manner as the legally mandated German
works councils. See id. at 321-33. In nations like France and Spain, weaker unions have viewed
employer efforts to create workplace based councils as threats rather than opportunities to
extend their representational role. See id.
109. The most influential essayremains: Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769 (1983).
110. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Strikinga NewBalance: Freedom ofContractandtheProspects
for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. RaV. 351,405-12 (1984).
111. E.g., Marion Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A
Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REV. 953, 1011-21 (1990).
112. E.g., National Labor Relations Act/Railway Labor Relations Act Amendment, S. 55,
103d Cong. (1993) (unenacted bill that would have made it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to replace a striking worker permanently).
113. See Weiler, supra note 109, at 397-404.
114. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for
Collective Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. REV. 329, 333-63 (1998).
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decentralized system would point to unproductive labor posturing and turmoil, as well
as the loss of capital investments and jobs, as the price of any regrowth of the union
movement. Defenders of the reinvigorated system, by contrast, would not be able to
show a major redistribution of income to labor through a collective bargaining system
that did not transcend its institutionalized decentralization. By demanding too much
of the old, and thinking too little of a new system, when the political moment was
right, the labor movement would end up losing all when political institutions
inevitably reacted.
B. A Two-Tier Representational System
Though neither is practical in America's current economic and political climate,
both of the last two sets of proposals-those for adoption of some kind of works-
council system and those to reform American labor law to facilitate collective
bargaining-nonetheless provide guideposts for a more promising direction for
reform. The works-council proposal suggests a kind of workplace representation that
need not be as threatening to American business, while the proposals for labor-law
reform suggest how that representation can be achieved.
The central problem with works councils in America is that they would further
inhibit rather than encourage the revivification of American unions and the
countervailing political power that unions can provide on behalf of the economic
interests of average American workers. This central problem can be addressed by
having unions play the role of works councils. Unions, of course, better than any ad
hoc group created by managers or by government agents, are well equipped to serve
any oftheproposed functions of works councils in America, including the critical one
highlighted here of insuring a system ofjust treatment of individual workers. They
have experience, expertise, resources, and a basis for independent action.
There are, however, two obvious problems with having unions serve the roles
proposed for works councils: first, imposing particular unions and union dues on
groups of employees without their consent; and second, separating unions as work
site representatives from unions as traditional collective bargaining agents. Solving
the first problem necessitates requiring a would-be works-council representative to
display majority employee support in some appropriate unit. Such a requirement, in
any event, accords much better with American traditions and political culture than the
imposition on workers of some mandatory employee representative. There are reasons
other than union dues and the threat ofjob losses for workers to resist having some
representative speak for them. Some workers may want to use their individual-
bargaining leverage to defend themselves as individuals rather than to have to pool
that leverage and deal with the elected leaders of some representative, even one that
takes no dues from their paychecks.
Solving the second problem-that of unions serving dual roles-necessitates legal
framing of a two-tier representational system, rather than the two-channel system
presented by most proposals for works councils. This means that in order to serve as
a traditional collective bargaining representative with authority to use economic
coercion to secure enhanced benefits, a union must clear hurdles beyond those
erected for the first-tier employee-representational function.
The proposals for reform of regulation of the organizational campaign, and the
resistance to that reform, suggest how the two tiers can be distinguished. A first-tier
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employee representative would have authority to negotiate and implement collective
bargaining agreements, including "just cause for discipline" and grievance-arbitration
clauses, as well as to assist in the enforcement of any external laws delegated to
employee representatives. A first-tier representative, however, would not have
authority to engage in strikes or other forms of economic coercion in support of its
bargaining demands. Furthermore, its negotiation and consultation authority would
be limited to a unit no larger than all employees at a single situs, with the exception
of units of temporary workers who regularly change work sites.
In order to serve as a first-tier employee representative, a union might be required
only to present verifiable authorization cards from a majority of the employees in
some appropriate unit. Alternatively, in order to be more certain of majority support,
we might require unions seeking first-tier status to stand for an immediate-
certification election in which employers could not participate2 5 The arguments for
exposing employees to employer persuasion in an extended-certification election,",6
in any event, do not apply where the employees are not risking theirjobs by selecting
a representative who can call strikes and seek wage premiums. To insure that
employees could freely choose a representative for grievance arbitration, union
organizers also would have orderly access to employees in order to attempt to
convince them to sign recognition cards,"1 7 and penalties for employers who denied
such access or discriminated against employees for giving unions support would be
magnified."'
Furthermore, the labor board would be invested with a new authority to impose,
through interest arbitration, contracts on employers and unions who cannot reach
agreement after some set period for bargaining, such as ninety days. Such contracts
would include just-cause and grievance-arbitration clauses, based on due-process
standards and industry practices, in addition to no-strike clauses enforceable through
115. Any direct restriction of employer participation, however, would invite a First
Amendment challenge. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945); NLRB v. Va. Elec.
& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469,477 (1941).
116. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 41, at 53-54.
117. Thus, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), in which the court failed to find
an unfair labor practice when employer barred nonemployee union organizers, 'ould be
overruled, and employers would be required to treat nonemployee union organizers under
nondiscriminatory rules ensuring reasonable on-site access. Those rules might require
employers to allow union organizers any special access to employees granted to managers
opposing union organizations, such as work-time, "captive-audience" presentations. See
Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951) (board's erstwhile reading of such a rule into the
current statute).
118. I agree with Professor Weiler that this magnification should provide for the same kind
of legal damages available to victims of employment discrimination under Title VII. See
WELER, supra note 41, at 247-48. The 1991 amendments to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)
(1994), allow not only compensatory damages, but also punitive damages where the employer
shows "malice" or "reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual." Id.; see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (malice or reckless
indifference requires the bad faith of senior management and awareness of applicability of
relevant federal prohibitions). Attorneys who prove that particular employees have been
discriminated against for union activity also should be able to collect reasonable attorney's fees
available to successful attorneys in Title VII cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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injunctions as well as damages." 9 The just-cause and grievance-arbitration clauses
would require employers to apply their chosen standards and rules consistently in all
decisions affecting individual employees, but these clauses would not authorize
arbitrators to dictate the substance of the standards or rules. The contracts also would
require employers to provide information and to respond to a representative's
requests for consultation on any decision that might affect represented employees.
The contracts would not impose further bargaining obligations or restrictions on
unilateral action, however. Nor would the contracts include provisions on wages or
fringe benefit plans, other than ones to assist in the enforcement of some external law
like the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")' 20 or ERISA.
A first-tier representative would not need the authority to engage in economic
strikes to make such contracts meaningful. In the first place, these contracts could be
enforced under the authority and common-law doctrine of section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA").' 2 ' Arbitrators therefore would provide the
first line of enforcement. An employer's recalcitrant refusal to abide by an arbitration
system, moreover, would be an unfair labor practice, which should be punishable by
serious labor board-imposed sanctions. Such a refusal also could warrant an unfair
labor practice strike called by the first-tier representative and not restricted by a no-
strike clause in a contract which the employer is materially breaching."
Only second-tier employee representatives, however, would have authority to
engage in legally protected strikes or other forms of economic coercion to attempt to
convince an employer to agree to a more favorable collective agreement, including
one that included provisions on wage- and fringe-benefit requirements that exceed
those imposed by external law. Furthermore, sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d)" would be
qualified so that employers would have no enforceable duty to bargain over topics
other than those which could be subject to interest arbitration with a first-tier
representative. In order to have any legally protected economic power to move an
employer to bargain over wages and fringe benefits, therefore, a union would have
to achieve the authority of a second-tier representative.
To do so, the union would have to obtain authorization to strike in a secret-ballot
election conducted in any bargaining unit for which the union wants to bargain as a
second-tier representative. The scope of second-tier bargaining units would not be
limited to the size of units for first-tier representatives; the board would be directed
to approve even multiemployer units if requested by a union.'24 In order to further
encourage centralized bargaining, a union could seek to be a second-tier
representative of employees who have other first-tier representatives; employees'
first- and second-tier representatives would not have to be identical. Employees not
represented by the union seeking second-tier status should be able to have a separate
119. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
122. Even under current doctrine, therefore, the strikers would be protected from
replacement as well as discharge. E.g., Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203,
1206-07 (8th Cir. 1979).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1994).
124. Existing bargaining representatives could be granted grandfather rights to have second-
tier authority in their current bargaining units.
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vote before being included in the larger second-tier unit, however.
The strike-authorization election would not be held immediately after the union
requested the strike authority; the employer would be given ample opportunity to
attempt to convince its employees not to provide the authorization, given the risks of
job loss from wage premiums or from replacements and the benefits to which the
employer has agreed without incurring the threat of strike pressure. This is the point
at which arguments for employer influence over an employee vote become
persuasive; a more meaningful debate on the union's ability to extract a wage
premium can be engaged when the union seeks the authority to strike, especially if
employers are required to provide the union adequate information to verify any
economic claims."z
Although the force of section 8(a)(5) would be weakened under this proposal, the
force of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) would not. Employers still would be prohibited
from taking discriminatory or retaliatory action against employees for choosing union
representation or for any other support ofa labor organization, includingparticipation
in a protected strike called by a second-tier representative. Reducing benefits, laying
offemployees, or moving capital in response to union activity, rather than in response
to the demonstrated economic effects of union action, thus still would be illegal. 26
Employees also should be given an opportunity to withdraw union strike authority
during an appropriate window before the commencement of negotiation of a new
collective agreement. Petitions for decertification elections could be filed by
employees under rules similar to those under current law. Consistent with rules
governing certification, in order to encourage fair representation of dual-union
employees, decertification elections also could be held in any segment of a second-
tier unit that has a separate first-tier representative. Petitions in addition could
seek removal of a union's first-tier authority without challenging second-tier
representation. Employers, however, would not be able to escape a union's
representational status on the basis of independently obtained information."" There
would be a presumption of continuing first-tier status, as well as of second-tier strike
authority, that only could be removed by a secret-ballot election.
125. Such a requirement does not exist currently, of course. Employers only are required to
provide supporting data for claims of complete inability to pay higher wages demanded by a
union in collective bargaining. Compare NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54
(1956), with Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168, 1170-
71 (7th Cir. 1992).
126. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great DaneTrailers, 388 U.S. 26,34 (1967); Textile Workers Union
v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965); NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d
324, 327-28 (6th Cir. 1955). I also would favor modification of Darlington to clarify the
prohibition of any anti-union motivated decision on the allocation of capital.
127. See Joan Flynn,A TripleStandard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges to an Incumbent
Union, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 653, 705 (stating that employers should be able to obtain elections
when they have a reasonable basis to doubt continuing majority status, but they should not be
able to withdraw recognition without an election).
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C. Meeting the Criteria
This two-tier proposal is designed to meet the five criteria set forth above for
evaluating proposals addressing union decline. First, no other current proposal,
whether or not directed at union decline, could lead to a more significant expansion
of the number of American workers effectively protected from unjust discharge or
discipline. Unions should be able to rapidly double or perhaps even triple their
membership numbers bysecuring first-tier representational responsibilities. Adoption
of the recognition-card check or accelerated election system and other reform
proposals for first-tier representation would ease the organizing burden. Employees,
moreover, would not have to fear job loss by giving unions authority only to consult,
to control grievances, and to implement external law, rather than to negotiate wage
premiums. In addition, managers would not feel compelled to resist union
representation that did not threaten profits by the specter of such premiums. Managers
instead could accept readily a grievance-arbitration system, as well as other
protectfons of individual employee rights, that easily could more than pay for
themselves by reduced employee turnover and consequent improvements in
productivity.'28
Union leaders conducting an organizing campaign under current law of course
could pledge that they would not call strikes to secure enhanced wages or benefits.
The employees the union seeks to represent might be skeptical of such a pledge,
however, and most union leaders today must feel pressure to claim that they will
128. Union-commissioned polling data indicates that a majority of American workers may
be receptive to unions, but that many believe that they could lose theirjobs if they participated
in organizing drives or strikes. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 30, at 1, 28-34; Peter D. Hart
Assocs. Inc., Americans' Attitudes Toward Unions (March 1999) (unpublished research, on
file with the Indiana Law Journal). This data can be read to suggest that changing the law to
reduce the risk of job loss and to provide an alternative form of independent representation
could galvanize union expansion.
Significant union success in achieving first-tier representational status is also predicted by
Richard Freeman's and Joel Rogers's comprehensive telephone survey of 2500 representative
workers in the mid- 1990s. Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Do Workers Want? Voice,
Representation and Power in the American Workplace, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 50TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998). Freeman
and Rogers found that 40% of the workers would vote for a union and believed that most
workers at their workplace also would vote for a union in the current system if they could do
so immediately in an election. Id. at 15. A majority of the workers surveyed agreed that
management opposition was the reason that they did not have a union currently. Id. at 23. A
majority of the surveyed workers preferred "joint employee and management committees," but
ones in which the employee representatives were elected and enjoyed real power, including the
ability to insist that final decisions on contested issues be made by an outside arbitrator. Id. at
15-16. Freeman and Rogers also found that most workers felt that independent "worker
regulatory committees". could iiprove enforcement of safety and health standards. Id. at 30.
There is also a great deal of anecdotal evidence that workers resist unions because of the
fear of the impact of strikes. Douglas Fraser, once the President of the United Auto Workers,
for instance, attributes his old union's recent difficulty organizing a Mercedes-Benz plant in
Alabama to such a fear. See Don't Walk- Why Labor Unions Have Grown Reluctant To Use
the S" Word, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1999, at Al.
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achieve benefit enhancement to prove their mettle. More importantly, under current
law, managers cannot be certain that any union leaders will continue a policy of
restraint after securing representational status.
If my proposal were adopted managers could fear that first-tier representational
status would serve as a bridgehead for gaining authority to strike over wage and
benefit premiums. But before a union could secure such authority, the managers
would have an opportunity to explain to employees why economic coercion could
threatenjobs without providing a realistic chance for wage and benefit enhancement.
In most cases the managers also would have a longer period in which to develop a
stable relationship with the union, and to convince its rank and file, and perhaps its
leadership, that coercive bargaining could be destructive. Moreover, the fact that the
employees could benefit from the system of industrial justice secured by the union,
without also empowering the union to strike for greater benefits, would make the
union's case for strike authority more rather than less difficult.
Union leaders, on the other hand, could be expected to be hesitant to jeopardize
their union's status as a first-tier representative for the uncertainties of a strike-
authorization vote that could divide their membership and spoil good relations with
the employer. They would have the security of knowing that to maintain their
leadership position and the collection of some level of union dues, they would not
have to take such a risk. It seems likely that union leaders would seek strike authority
not for purposes of empty and destructive posturing, but rather only where they were
convinced that their level of organization was sufficient to secure a wage and benefit
premium-that is where there is some surplus rent from which the employees could
extract a greater share or where the union had achieved sufficient organizational
density to take wages out of competition.
This analysis suggests that this proposal also is well designed to meet the second
standard for assessing labor-law reform proposals: whether it encourages more
effective, centralized industry-wide bargaining, rather than the ineffective
decentralized bargaining that characterizes much of the American industrial-relations
systemtoday. The proposal encourages effective centralized bargainingby extricating
union leaders from the dilemma of having to choose between bargaining in a small
unit with no market power and notbeinga representative at all. Instead, union leaders
can organize gradually as first-tierrepresentatives, delaying seeking authorityto strike
for wage premiums until they have sufficient breadth of organization to assure
employers that they will not threaten their competitive position. Admittedly, where
international competition is a significant consideration, the employers' flexibility still
will be limited even after broad domestic organization, but even in such
circumstances, a secure union leadership is more likely to be a responsible union
leadership, concerned that any wage demands do not threaten the jobs and the union
dues they support.
By eliminating the incentive to attempt to manipulate government regulation of
collective negotiations through the good-faith bargaining command in section 8(a)(5),
the proposal also encourages union leaders only to seek redistributive collective
bargaining when they have real market power. A union could not, for instance, hope
to extract a wage premium over the short term by claiming that a strike was provoked
by the employer's lack of good faith or by delaying capital movement during fruitless,
formal bargaining to impasse. Elimination of the good faith bargaining command for
terms that cannot be imposed by first-tier interest arbitration would mean that unions
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would gain nothing by attempting to achieve redistribution without an effective strike
or other economic-coercion threat.
At the same time that it encourages any coercive collective bargaining that could
result in work stoppages to have a real promise of at least some degree of income
redistribution, moreover, this proposal also satisfies my third suggested criterion for
labor-law reform by promising an almost immediate enhancement of union electoral
political power. Unions will be able to collect dues or agency fees, albeit probably at
a reduced level, from employees in bargaining units that are only on the first-tier.
Moreover, even if the restraints imposed by the Supreme Court on the use of such
dues or fees for electoral political purposes' were maintained, a union's role as a
grievance representative will enable it to secure active members and to develop
political organization and communication systems. Many, many more middle- and
lower-income American workers would feel connected to organizations tied together
in a federation that could lobby more effectively for income redistribution through the
enactment of legislation that mandates that all private employers provide particular
benefits regardless of their collective bargaining obligations.
Indeed, it probably would be the prospect of such enhancement of unions' political
power, more than the threat ofan enhancement of their collective bargaining leverage,
that would generate the political opposition to this proposal. Unfortunately, the
current Republican Party has found it convenient to cut almost all ties to a weakened
labor movement and would feel especially threatened by any renaissance. 30
Moreover, business opposition could be insurmountable even within a Democratic
Party that gained control ofboth houses of Congress as well as the White House. This
proposal, like otherlabor-law reformproposals, thus admittedlyis probablynot viable
in the current political climate. Unlike the labor movement's current "wish list,"1'
however, this proposal promises a stable labor-relations system that could be
workable in today's economy and difficult to overturn once enacted during a political
moment that is most favorable to labor.
First, by discouraging bargaining over wages and fringe benefits in small units
without market power, it promises more stable collective bargaining and no increase
in disruptive strikes. The proposal also somewhat deregulates bargaining over wages
and fringe benefits by withdrawing section 8(a)(5)'s vague, but labor board enforced
command for "good faith" bargaining over such subjects.' Employers thus would
not have to worry about going through the motions of bargaining to impasse before
making unilateral changes in benefits or other working conditions necessary to
competitive operations.' Employers would have to worry only about the union's
enforcement of contractual commitments and a second-tier representative's authority
to strike in response to unilateral change. To further encourage nondisruptive
bargaining, moreover, the proposal could include a compromise on the strike-
replacement issue, such as a time limit on the right of second-tier economic strikers
129. E.g., Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 751-54 (1988).
130. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Labor Dares Republicans To Cut Its Political Clout,
N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 18, 1997, at AIS.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14.
132. See supra text accompanying note 123.
133. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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to strike without the threat of permanent replacement.134
The resiliency of the proposal also could be enhanced by providing that any
grievance-arbitration system negotiated with a first-tier union representative and
meeting certain minimunm-process standards would provide the exclusive procedural
recourse for employee challenges to employer discharge and discipline. Such a
displacement of the two-track system secured by Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver135-grievance arbitration for contract claims and judicial consideration of
claims under external public law-should be dependent on the arbitration system
affording neutral arbitrators all the remedies granted by the external law they would
be enforcing. It also should be dependent on union control of access to the arbitration
system being qualified for claims based on external law. For such claims grievants
should be guaranteed use of arbitration and the option of representation by an
advocate other than the union 3 -an option that employees would certainly want to
avail where they accused the union of participating in discrimination or union-
prominent coworkers of engaging in harassment.
The viability of this two-tier proposal also is greater because it satisfies my fifth
criterion-it attempts to invigorate, rather than supplant, existing American
institutions, unions, and collective bargaining, and thus has a natural constituency.
Unlike works councils or minority representation, this two-tier proposal poses no
threats to unions. Its adoption could only expand their membership and influence and
provide expanded roles in the implementation of minimum-benefit legislation and
other external law. All of the functions that it contemplates for union leaders should
be familiar.
Of course this proposal does compromise some of the tenets underlying the NLRA
and held as principles of faith by some labor leaders and academic friends of
labor-especially the meaningfulness ofan expansive scope ofmandatorybargaining
and of nonsubstantive government regulation of the collective bargaining process.
But unlike proposals to compromise section 8(a)(2), it picks the correct provision of
the Act to qualify. This proposal appreciates that section 8(a)(2) embodies the special
genius of American labor-its understanding that there are conflicts between the
interests of management and labor, as well as between those of capital and labor, and
that the independence of an employee representative from management is therefore
essential if that representative is to protect the interests of labor.137 The proposal also
recognizes that at least in today's competitive world a union's ability to bargain
collectively for wage premiums must derive from real market power, and not from
what has become both futile and burdensome government regulation of process.
The compatibility of the proposal with American institutions and law also is
evidenced by the ease with which it could be integrated with other reform proposals
to address special current problems in our labor-management relations system.
Consider, for instance, the increasing difficulty posed for that system by methods of
134. See generally Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?:
Reflections on Antistrike Breaker Legislation, 93 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1994).
135. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
136. These options have not typically been granted under collective bargaining agreements
as they have developed under our current system.
137. See generally Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain
Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499 (1986).
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supervisory control in occupations in which unions have attempted to expand
organizing activity, such as nurses and doctors' in the health sector, as well as by
the greater devolution of supervisory authority to some front line workers in other
sectors. The two-tierproposal offers a means to compromise the resulting controversy
over who should be excluded from the coverage of the NLRA as a supervisor 39
Unions might be allowed to represent employees with a degree of supervisory
authority for purposes of achieving a regime to.protect minimum contractual and
statutory rights to an equitable and safe workplace without the unions also being
authorized to impel the supervisors to strike in an attempt to extract special wage or
benefit premiums.
Consider also the controversy over the adequacy of the law developed by the
Supreme Court to deal with the sale of capital made productive by employees
represented by a collective bargaining agent. Under the current Supreme Court
crafted, ostensibly formalistic doctrine, if the capital is sold through a transfer of
stock holdings, the collective bargaining relationship and any extant collective
bargaining agreement continue in effect; but if the capital is transferred directly by
a sale of assets, the collective bargaining agreement is defunct and the new owner
even can escape the bargaining relationship by hiring more new employees than old
ones retained. 4 ' A strong argument can be made that under the current NLRA, a
transfer of ownership, whether effected by a sale of stock or a sale of assets, should
extinguish neither the collective bargaining relationship nor any extant collective
bargaining agreement. Since the employees have been organized to bargain with the
providers of the capital that the employees make productive, the identity of the
providers should make no difference to the employees' statutory or contractual
rights.141
A case also can be made, however, that an abrupt transfer of controlling ownership
of capital, such as always occurs when assets are sold directly and which may occur
when large blocks of stock are sold, should signal to employees that their demands
for wage premiums may be putting their jobs at risk. A sale of capital does not
necessarily mean that there is a significantly increased risk that the capital will be
withdrawn from the use that supports the employees' jobs; a small firm's unusually
high profit margins, for instance, often prompt the interest of larger potential buyers.
But a sale of capital may signal especially low returns and the vulnerability ofjobs.
All these considerations could be accounted for if the proposed two-tier bargaining
system were adopted. Any transfer of capital control, whether through asset or stock
sale, would not be an occasion for an abrogation of the basic first-tier collective
bargaining relationship or for renegotiation of the job-security guarantees secured
through that relationship. Thus, contrary to current law,4' a direct purchaser of assets
would have to continue to offer employment to the employees who were making
those assets productive under the former owner. The new owners' employees,
however, could be given an opportunity after the sale to reassess the wage premium
138. E.g., Chris Phan, Physician Unionization, 20 J. LEGALMED. 115 (1999).
139. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,576-78 (1994);
Providence Hospital, 320 N.L.R.B. 717 (1996).
140. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
141. See Harper, supra note 114, at 356-63.
142. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 262-64 (1974).
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they have extracted from the prior owner and any strike authority they have invested
in the union. The new employer thus could ask for a secret ballot election in which
the employees would vote on whether they wanted to reopen any existing contract
and whether they wanted to withdraw their prior strike authorization. Before the
election the new employer could conduct a debate with the union concerning either
vote.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the speculative elaborations of possible doctrine spun out in the last several
paragraphs make clear, this Article represents an attempt to broaden the debate on
possible labor-law reform, not a definitive cataloging of all ihe aspects of an ideal
reform package. The approach of the Article reflects a conviction that effective
reform must be attentive to the past, present, and future of American labor relations.
Effective reform must build on the institutions developed over our history, especially
collective bargaining through independent labor unions; and it must learn from the
lessons of the past, especially on the benefits to average, rather than favored
employees, of the same kind of divided power at the workplace that has benefitted
average, rather than favored citizens, in the political system.'43 Effective reform,
however, also must recognize the realities of today's global competitive economy and
must be designed so that it and the labor movement it invigorates can survive in that
economy. The labor movement eventually may be provided with another political
opportunity; it best be ready.
143. See generally Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee
Supervision of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).
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